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The Law of Evidence:
Privacy and Disclosure*
Richard C. Donnellyt
The frequent assertion that the rules of evidence were
spawned by trial by jury is an over-simplification. Judicial dis-
trust of the jury, as Professor Morgan has shown,' is responsible-
for only some of the rules. Ancient ideas regarding the reliability
of witnesses have contributed. Judicial beliefs that the suppres-
sion of truth is essential to the fostering of certain relationships
have played a part. The adversary theory of litigation has ac-
counted for many of the rules. But ideals of justice have also
been influential. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has described this
influence as follows: 2
"Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evi-
dence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance
of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by
reason which are summarized as 'due process of law' and
below which we reach what is really trial by force. . . . The
principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those
derived solely from the Constitution. In the exercise of its
supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts . . . this Court has, from the
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence
to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. . . . And in
formulating such rules of evidence for federal criminal
trials the Court has been guided by considerations of justice
not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance."
* The substance of this article was presented as a paper before the
University of Chicago Law School's Conference on Freedom and the Law
on May 7, 1953. The author also wishes to acknowledge the diligent and con-
scientious assistance of Mr. George Pratt, class of 1953, Yale Law School.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 247 (1937).
2. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
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The profundity of Justice Frankfurter's observations be-
comes apparent if attention is focused on two themes running
through the law of evidence: Privacy and Disclosure.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Respect for human dignity and individual freedom neces-
sarily demands respect for privacy. "[S]ecurity of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police .. . is basic to a free
society."'8 Not only is privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment against unreasonable searches and seizures by federal
police officials but it is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered lib-
erty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause."4 But only a part of the claim to personal
privacy is protected by the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas has suggested that "the meaning of 'liberty' as used
in the Fifth Amendment . . .must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy
as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom."5 However, it is
not necessary to accept this far-reaching suggestion to locate at
least two enclaves in addition to the search and seizure one
where personal privacy has been protected by the Supreme
Court. First, there are the illegal detention cases. Arrest whether
lawful or unlawful with incommunicado detention for periods
up to a week and sometimes more is a persistent and widespread
police practice. Prior to 1943, these violations of statutes requir-
ing prompt or immediate arraignment would not alone render
inadmissible in evidence a confession obtained during a period
of illegal detention. In that year the Supreme Court announced
a new rule of evidence in the McNabb and Anderson cases6
which was designed to reduce police incentive to violate the ar-
raignment statutes. It provided that any confession obtained
during a period of unlawful police detention should be excluded
in federal criminal trials however voluntary the confession might
otherwise appear.
Another group of cases involving the invasion of privacy
are the wiretapping ones. In 1928, the Supreme Court, over the
3. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
4. Ibid.
5. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (dis-
senting opinion).
6. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Anderson v. United
States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
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vigorous dissents of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone,
held that wiretapping was neither a search nor a seizure and
therefore not banned by the Fourth Amendment. 7 This settled
the constitutional question but the issue came before the Court
again in statutory form nine years later. The Court then held
that the Communications Act of 1934 forbids the admission in
federal criminal trials of evidence secured by wiretapping.8
In all three of these situations-unlawful search and seizure,
confessions obtained during illegal detention, and wiretapping-
personal privacy is not only recognized but invasions are pro-
hibited and sanctioned by excluding in federal criminal trials
evidence so obtainedY But the exclusionary rule is not the only
sanction. It is reinforced in the search and seizure and in the
wiretapping cases by the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
which renders inadmissible not only evidence illegally obtained
but also any other evidence resulting from the illegality. 10
Strangely enough, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the
doctrine to the illegal detention cases."
That the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
protecting privacy in these three types of cases and has applied
the exclusionary rule does not mean that invasions of privacy
have been deterred effectively or that the policy expressed has
been realized fully. The exclusionary rule has been diluted by
various limitations and exceptions. It operates only in situations
where the evidence has been illegally seized by federal officials.
Consequently, the use of evidence by a federal prosecutor is not
barred when illegally seized by a-state officer without federal
connivance, 12 nor when the evidence is illegally obtained from
the defendant by a private party.' 3 And until recently the use of
evidence by a federal prosecutor was not barred when obtained
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
8. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
9. The exclusionary rule was first established in federal search and seiz-
ure cases in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
10. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (search
and seizure case); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (wiretap-
ping).
11. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947) (first confession which
was not offered, would have been inadmissible under the McNabb rule, sec-
ond confession made after proper arraignment held admissible even though
psychologically the fruit of the first). See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953).
12. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
13. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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by a federal official in violation of the privacy, not of the defen-
dant, but of some third party. 14
In the illegal detention cases, the Court has refused to ex-
tend the McNabb rule to a situation where an accused is lawfully
arraigned on one charge (perhaps a minor one) and then ques-
tioned about other crimes for which he was not arraigned. 15
The refusal to treat wiretapping as a search and seizure has
given the police free reign in using other electronic devices such
as the detectaphone 6 and "walky-talky" radio1" which are not
within the proscriptions of the Communications Act. And the
burden of proof placed upon the defendant in the wiretapping
cases has rendered the exclusionary rule an illusory safeguard.
He must prove that his wires were in fact tapped-information
that can only be obtained fortuitously and if the government is
careless. 8
The most serious limitation upon the exclusionary rule is its
inapplicability to state court proceedings. 9 To those who believe
that the Supreme Court's most vital function is protecting and
vindicating basic individual freedoms-that in fulfilling this
function it is justified in abandoning many of the self-imposed
limitations on judicial power recognized in other types of con-
stitutional adjudication-it is difficult to accept the Court's posi-
tion that obligations of federalism require so high a degree of
judicial self-abnegation. This is particularly true in the unrea-
sonable search and seizure cases where the Court has recognized
a federal right of privacy as "basic to a free society." To leave
to the states freedom in formulating devices for the protection
of a federal right is to leave to them the power to give or with-
hold from it content, meaning and reality.20
On the other hand, any meaningful appraisal of the exclu-
sionary rule requires a consideration of present attitudes and
14. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). For excellent discussions
of these exceptions see Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federal-
ism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 Ill. L. Rev. 1 (1950); Comment, Judicial Con-
trol of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L.J. 144 (1948).
15. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951). See Note, 60 Yale L.J.
1228 (1951).
16. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
17. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
18. United States v. Weinberg, 108 F. Supp. 567 (D.C. D.C. 1952); Note,
61 Yale L.J. 1221 (1952).
19. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (search and seizure); Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (confession obtained during illegal deten-
tion); Schwartz v. State, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (wiretapping).
20. See Allen, supra note 14, at 30.
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trends regarding the right of privacy itself. This raises the larger
question of the 'peril in which traditional respect for privacy
stands in the modern world and whether it should be abandoned
or whether, on the contrary, we should attempt to salvage as
much as possible from what is perhaps a sinking ship.
2
'
1
Privacy is threatened on two fronts. One is the rapid in-
crease in scientific and technical knowledge about how it can be
invaded. The other is the intensity with which certain demands
for invasion are generated. Scientific and technological develop-
ments become irrevocable traits of the culture-however difficult
the problems of assimilation and adjustment they engender.
Modern science and invention have developed a host of means
by which it is possible to penetrate the traditional zones of pri-
vacy. The telephone brought the wiretap' When the microphone
was developed, concealed microphones became a reality. With
radio has come the "walky-talky" that can be hidden on the per-
son. The modern camera has limitless possibilities. Infra-red
photography enables a record to be made without a flash bulb.
The "peeping Tom" has acquired a new dimension with the in-
vention of the distance lens. One-way glass makes it feasible to
observe the conduct of persons who imagine they are unob-
served. Blood tests and intoxication tests have achieved a high
degree of reliability. Physiological instruments-the "lie-detec-
tors"-have been adapted to tests for deception. The most start-
ling results have been obtained by hypnosis and the so-called
"truth serums" such as sodium amytal. Subjects can be induced
to reveal their entire life history even to the most intimate de-
tails-revelations they do not recall when consciousness is re-
gained.
These developments clearly indicate that the time is near
when all private thoughts and feelings will be vulnerable to en-
forced disclosure. When this day arrives, privacy, from a scien-
tific and technical point of view, will be a thing of the past.
Accompanying the solution of the technical problems in-
volved another trend is discernible. This is the growth of demands
to use these scientific instruments in penetrating hitherto inac-
cessible areas of human life. Some of these demands spring from
persons skilled in the use of the new instruments who are ab-
21. For the following general discussion of privacy I have relied heavily
upon the insights of Harold Lasswell. See Lasswell, The Threat to Privacy.
In Conflict of Loyalties: A series of addresses and discussions 121-140 (1952).
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sorbed in the purely technical task of carrying a method to the
highest degree of refinement. Often these technicians are insensi-
tive to the significance of what they are doing to the ideal of
privacy. They do not think of themselves as the avant-garde of
contempt for human dignity. In addition, the media of mass
communications have taken a most active interest in dissolving
old barriers and anyone who challenges their practices is likely
to be assailed as an enemy of freedom of the press.
Policymakers in large business organizations are responsible
for some of the most far-reaching invasions of privacy. An ever-
present problem is the selection and promotion of personnel. Not
only is the lie-detector widely used in examining employees but
there is an expanding concern on the part of modern manage-
ment for the selection of employees on the basis of aptitude tests
and temperament tests. Demands for more intimate knowledge
of persons eligible to be top executives have led to the encour-
agement of psychiatric and other appraisals.
The community itself seems to be demanding greater inva-
sions of privacy. The emergence of crime as a national issue has
led many to believe that laws for the protection of the indi-
vidual have too often been exploited and abused. The result has
been a softness towards practices on the part of private detec-
tives, police, courts, congressional committees, and crime com-
missions that contravene some of the traditional methods of pro-
tecting privacy. The increasing impatience with the privilege
against self-incrimination is an obvious example.
The most striking concentration of incentives undermining
privacy occurs in the realm of national security. Even though
World War III is avoided, the continuing crisis of insecurity in
world affairs is likely to bring serious transformations in the
community's way of life and especially in its willingness'to pro-
tect individual freedom. As the "garrison-police state" is more
closely approximated, greater invasions of privacy are to be an-
ticipated.
Under these grim circumstances the burden of surveillance
that is put upon the agencies which perform the political police
function is exceedingly heavy. There are strong inducements to
take shortcuts. Police departments are already accustomed to
gather information which is inadmissible in court because of
methods used. In addition to wiretapping, the lie-detector has
become routine police procedure in some quarters. Similar uses
[VOL. XIV
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of "truth drugs" are to be expected. The employment of these
techniques is usually justified on the ground of efficiency in clear-
ing the innocent and in exposing the most eligible suspects for
further investigation.
Another important factor is that privacy has by no means
been felt to be an unmitigated blessing. One of the most char-
acteristic complaints in modern civilization has been against the
"impersonality" of modern industry and the destruction of close
personal relations. In this connection, modern social science has
discovered what Durkheim termed the problem of "anomie."
Durkheim undertook to account for the prevalence of suicide in
modern society and was led to the conception of anomie, or lack
of identification, on the part of the primary ego of the individual
with a "self" that includes others. 22 In other words, modern man
appeared to be suffering from psychic isolation. This conception
of anomie has been greatly enriched by the findings of modern
psychology. In a complex and changing world, millions of people
are thrown into novel situations in both an ideological and oper-
ational sense. Older ways of thinking and performing are no
longer appropriate. The resulting uncertainty is a fertile breeder
of anxiety. The accompanying tensions of non-identification may
be released by invasions of privacy.
It appears, then, that animosity against privacy is one of the
major drives of our time; that the trend in America is in the
direction of restricting and perhaps abolishing privacy. If this
hypothesis is sound then it is imperative that we reconsider the
importance that we should attach to respect for privacy. The
evaluation, however, should not be swayed by the bare fact of a
trend running counter to traditional beliefs.
How have the courts responded to this trend away from
privacy and what has been the role of the law of evidence? In
addition to the three types of cases previously discussed, what
has been the response of the courts to the new scientific tech-
niques? Any rule of evidence or any judicial attitude that ex-
cludes the results of scientific techniques may be considered by
some to be a desirable protection of privacy. The new knowledge
and the new methods of scientists are obstructed, for example,
by the unwillingness of courts to accept as reliable conclusions
that informed scientific opinion unanimously regards as reliable;
by the hypothetical question which Judge Learned Hand des-
22. Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology 241 et seq. (1951).
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cribed as "a wen on the fair face of justice"; by the rule which
forbids an expert opinion based even in part upon reports made
by third persons; by denying to an expert the right to support
his direct examination by quoting from medical treatises; and
by the lack of effective measures to prevent the "battle of ex-
perts." 23 But the retention of these incongruities is clearly a price
too high to pay. The task is to devise rules which will facilitate
appropriate uses of what science can contribute and still dis-
courage abuse and misuse.
The development of the drug-induced interview (narco-
analysis) pungently illustrates the ramifications of the problem.
If conducted under properly controlled conditions by a qualified
psychiatrist with experience in its use, an interview in which
the subject is partially under the influence of a drug may be a
proper and valuable auxiliary procedure in a thorough diagnostic
examination. When correctly used, narcoanalysis may enable
the psychiatrist to probe more deeply and quickly into the per-
sonality structure of the subject. But the results are not regarded
by the psychiatrist as "truth" but simply as clinical data to be
integrated with and interpreted in the light of what is otherwise
known about the subject's personality. 24 When so used and if
the subject has submitted voluntarily after advice of counsel
the psychiatrist should be permitted to express an opinion in
court about the subject's mental condition and personality. Here
is a situation where obstructive rules of evidence should be
modified so as to facilitate the use of new scientific techniques.
On the other hand, under no circumstances should a suspect be
forced to undergo narcoanalysis especially while in police cus-
tody. While in police custody the dangers of abuse and viola-
tion of individual privacy are so great as to require strong and
effective action by the courts in devising controls. One approach
would be to hold that the results of an involuntary drug induced
interview are inadmissible in evidence as a violation of the right
of privacy-the right of privacy to be constitutionally anchored
in the Fourth Amendment, the Privilege against Self-Incrimina-
tion, or (preferably) the Due Process clause. In this connection,
the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rochin v. Cali-
23. For a critical appraisal of the law of evidence in the light of the
march of modern science, see McCormick, Science, Experts and the Courts,
29 Texas L. Rev. 611 (1951).
24. For a more extensive discussion of the medico-legal aspects of
"truth serum," consult Dession, Freedman, Donnelly and Redlich, Drug-
Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 Yale L.J. 315 (1953).
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fornia25 is relevant. The admission in evidence of two morphine
capsules forcibly disgorged by a stomach pump was held to
violate due process. "Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner" does "more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too ener-
getically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. '2
But the exclusionary rule alone is not enough. The "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine should be applied where involuntary
narcoanalysis and similar procedures are used to obtain leads
or clues.
DISCLOSURE
If there is a trend away from the protection of privacy and
if the courts admit in evidence the results of these invasions,
justice requires that the accused, whose privacy has been in-
vaded, be given extensive disclosure. The Sixth Amendment
gives him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation. This guarantee has been interpreted to require
an indictment of sufficient particularity to permit the accused a
fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.27 The
same Amendment also gives him the right to be confronted with
the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor. The essential purpose of con-
frontation is to secure for the accused the opportunity for cross-
examination and to prevent his conviction upon depositions, ex
parte affidavits, or secret evidence.28 The protections of this
Amendment were succinctly summarized by the Supreme Court
in In re Oliver,29 as follows:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against
him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right
to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurispru-
dence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to
examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and
to be represented by counsel."
25. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also Inbau, The Perversion of Science in
Criminal and Personnel Investigations, 43 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 128
(1952).
26. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
27. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932). And see United States v.
Lattimore, 112 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. D.C. 1953).
28. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
29. 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Nor may the government successfully invoke the various
privileges in bar of disclosure at the trial. Disclosure of the
identity of an informer will be compelled where disclosure
would vindicate the innocence of the accused, lessen the risk of
false testimony, or where otherwise essential to the defense.30
And where evidence in the possession of the Government be-
comes "importantly relevant" to the defendant's case, it must
either produce that evidence at the trial for the defendant's use
or drop its prosecution against him. This rule applies even though
the evidence is otherwise privileged 1 Although this doctrine has
been based upon principles analogous to waiver it reflects the
value judgment that no one should be convicted of a crime with-
out having access to material which might exculpate him. And in
the Coplon case,32 Judge Learned Hand held that it was a viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment for the trial judge to refuse to
disclose all wiretaps to the defendant even though they contained
"State Secrets." He announced that:3 3
"[T]he prosecution must decide whether the public prej-
udice of allowing the crime to go unpunished was greater
than the disclosure of such 'state secrets' as might be rele-
vant to the defense....
"Few weapons in the arsenal of freedom are more use-
ful than the power to compel a government to disclose the
evidence on which it seeks to forfeit the liberty of its citi-
zens. All governments, democracies as well as autocracies,
believe that those they seek to punish are guilty; the impedi-
ment of constitutional barriers are galling to all governments
when they prevent the consummation of that just purpose.
But those barriers were devised and are precious because
they prevent that purpose and its pursuit from passing un-
challenged by the accused, and unpurged by the alembic of
public scrutiny and public criticism. A society which has
come to wince at such exposure of the methods by which it
30. Wilson v. United States, 59 F. 2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); Sorrentino v.
United States, 163 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947); United States v. Conforti, 200
F. 2d 365 (7th Cir. 1953). And see Note, 83 L. Ed. 155 (1939).
31. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); United
States v. Krulewitch, 145 F. 2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Schneider-
man, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Calif. 1952). See also Gordon v. United States,
344 U.S. 414 (1953) and United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
32. United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950); Note, 60 Yale L.J.
736 (1951).
33. United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950).
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seeks to impose its will upon its members, has already lost
the feel of freedom and is on the path towards absolutism."
Another example of disclosure is evidenced by the cases
holding it a denial of due process for a prosecutor to suppress or
fail to disclose evidence in his possession which tends to estab-
lish the innocence of the accused or even create reasonable doubt
of guilt.34
Until recent years an accused enjoyed little or no disclosure
prior to trial. It was not until 1927 that the New York Court of
Appeals canvassed the problem and sketched out certain limited
areas where discovery before trial might be ordered.35 And it was
not until 1946 that the Federal Criminal Rules made provision
for even limited pre-trial disclosure.8 6 American practice falls
short of the English and Continental procedure with respect to
discovery, a situation that Mr. Justice Jackson, in negotiating the
Ndirnberg Charter, described as follows:87
"It was something of a shock to me to hear the Russian
delegation object to our Anglo-American practice as not fair
to a defendant. The point of the observation was this: We
indict merely by charging the crime in general terms and
then we produce the evidence at the trial. Their method re-
quires that the defendant be given, as part of the indictment,
all evidence to be used against him-both documents and
the statements of witnesses."
The need for broader pre-trial discovery is underlined by the
growing intricacy of issues in criminal trials. Such modern crimes
as financial fraud, conspiracy, and anti-trust violations necessi-
tate elaborate investigation and research before trial. In fact they
34. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); United States v. Baldi, 195
F. 2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952); United States v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill.
1949); Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1946); Griffin v. United
States, 183 F. 2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950); People v. Riley, 191 Misc. 888, 83
N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1948).
35. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84
(1927).
36. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, 17(c). These rules were interpreted in Bowman
Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951). See also Fryer v. United
States, 207 F. 2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953). For an excellent discussion of discovery
in criminal cases, consult Comment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases,
60 Yale L.J. 626 (1951).
37. Jackson, The Nilrnberg Case vi (1947). In England, disclosure is also
an accepted part of criminal procedure. Archibold, Pleading, Evidence and
Practice in Criminal Cases 412-425 (31st ed. 1943). For discussions of the
French practice, see Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate (juge d'in-
struction) in European Criminal Procedure, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1010 (1935)
and Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France, 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 385 (1940).
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have grown so complicated that there is a real danger that our
procedure will break down.38 And, today, even an old-fashioned
murder case may involve complicated scientific evidence which
a defendant is without the resources to obtain.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Thus far this article has tried to indicate that in our crim-
inal procedure and law of evidence there is a recognition of the
value of individual privacy; that even though there may be a
trend toward permitting increased invasions this trend is ac-
companied by one in favor of increased disclosure. When we
turn, however, to certain administrative proceedings and legis-
lative investigations we find not only toleration of serious inva-
sions of privacy but also the very minimum of disclosure. Should
not the norms established in traditional criminal trials be em-
braced as constitutional imperatives in some administrative pro-
ceedings and shouldn't they at least be emulated in congressional
investigations?
Recent developments in American law have rendered the
distinction between criminal and certain "preventive" civil pro-
ceedings increasingly technical and artificial. The "accused" in
the world of today (meaning one threatened with severe sanc-
tions which in fact are "punitive" in character) increasingly
faces the possibility that he may be moved against, not only in
a traditional "criminal" proceeding, but in any one of a host of
executive, administrative or legislative proceedings aimed at
curtailing his privilege of participation in the life of the com-
munity.
A catalog of proceedings not technically classed as criminal
but resulting in the imposition of severe punitive sanctions
would include those for the denaturalization of naturalized citi-
zens, the deportation of aliens, the stigmatizing and exclusion
from public employment of persons whose loyalty is administra-
tively found to be suspect, the emergency detention provisions of
the McCarran Act, proceedings under the anti-trust laws for such
"equitable" relief as dissolution, divorcement and divestiture,
and the stigmatizing by members of congressional committees
38. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Anti-Trust Liti-
gation, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1950); Dession, The Trial of Economic and
Technological Issues of Fact, 58 Yale L.J. 1019 (1949); A Report adopted by
the Judicial Conference of United States, Procedure in Anti-Trust and
Other Protracted Cases (1951).
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of individuals who are afforded neither due process in the old-
fashioned sense of due notice and fair hearing nor any other
form of legal recourse.
On a few occasions the courts have set aside legislative ac-
tion purporting to be non-penal when they have detected a
punitive purpose and a failure to conform to constitutional stand-
ards for criminal prosecution. There was the case of Wong Wing 9
in 1896 where the Supreme Court considered a provision in the
immigration law that deportable Chinese aliens be imprisoned
at hard labor as an incident to deportation. The provision was
held invalid as an attempt to impose an infamous punishment
without benefit of the usual criminal procedures for the ascer-
tainment of guilt. In the Lovett case 40 in 1946 the Court struck
down as a "bill of attainder" a provision in an appropriation act
that "no salary or compensation shall be paid" three named em-
ployees in the executive branch whose loyalty was questioned in
Congress. The Court has also recognized that a denaturalization
case, though a "civil" proceeding, involves issues and sanctions of
such gravity as to impose on the government an exceptional
burden of proof, namely, "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
evidence which does not "leave the issue in doubt."41 But these
are the exceptional rulings. By and large we still lack any con-
sistently adhered to objective and operationally formulated set
of criteria for distinguishing between "criminal" and "civil" sanc-
tions. And in reviewing administrative or legislative action, the
courts are more likely to invoke the artificial distinction between
"right" and "privilege" than to make realistic appraisals.42
At the beginning of the discussion of disclosure four stand-
ards of justice in criminal cases were indicated: (1) The right of
the accused to a hearing; (2) the right of the accused to be in-
formed of all the evidence against him; (3) The right of the
accused to compel the government to produce at the trial evi-
dence in its possession for his use even though that evidence is
privileged; and (4) the right to pre-trial disclosure. Alarming
departures from the first three of these standards have occurred
in the past few years. Indicative of the drift away from tradi-
tional notions of fairness and justice are (1) the President's
39. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
40. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
41. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); Knauer v. United
States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946).
42. For an excellent analysis, see Davis, Administrative Law 246-254
(1951).
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Loyalty Order of 194743 and the new Executive Order of April
27, 1953, entitled "Security Requirements for Government Em-
ployment"; 44 (2) our treatment of aliens; (3) the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950; and (4) the conscientious objector cases.
(1) The Loyalty and Security Orders
These Executive Orders have involved drastic departures
from traditional procedures, especially with reference to rules
of evidence. Usually, the information disparaging the individual
comes from FBI reports based on communications from informers
whose identity is not disclosed. The loyalty board thus has no
means of testing the probative value or credibility of the infor-
mation. Furthermore, the accused is denied the historic right to
be confronted by and to cross-examine his accusers.45 The pro-
ceedings are secret, a nullification of the long-held belief that the
integrity of the judicial process depends upon public scrutiny
of its activities. The nature of the proceedings were eloquently
summarized and castigated by Judge Edgerton as follows: 46
"Without trial by jury, without evidence, and without
even being allowed to confront her accusers or to know their
identity, a citizen of the United States has been found dis-
loyal to the government of the United States."
43. Exec. Order No. 9835, 3 Code Fed. Regs. 129 (Supp. 1947).
44. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
45. 50 U.S.C. §§ 781 et seq. For a thorough discussion of this act, see
Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1951).
Also, Notes, 51 Col. L. Rev. 606 (1951), 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 221 (1952).
46. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (dissenting
opinion), affirmed by equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Mr. Justice Douglas described the proceedings in the Bailey case as
follows:
"The Loyalty Board convicts on evidence which it cannot even
appraise. The critical evidence may be the word of an unknown witness
who is 'a paragon of veracity, a knave, or the village idiot.' His name,
his reputation, his prejudices, his animosities, his trustworthiness are
unknown both to the judge and to the accused. The accused has no op-
portunity to show that the witness lied or was prejudiced or venal. With-
out knowing who her accusers are she has no way of defending. She has
nothing to offer except her own word and the character testimony of
her friends.
"Dorothy Bailey was not, to be sure, faced with a criminal charge
and hence not technically entitled under the Sixth Amendment to be
confronted with the witnesses against her. But she was on trial for her
reputation, her job, her professional standing. A disloyalty trial is the
most crucial event in the life of a public servant. If condemned, he is
branded for life as a person unworthy of trust or confidence. To make
that condemnation without meticulous regard for the decencies of a
fair trial is abhorrent to fundamental justice."
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1951)
(concurring opinion). See also O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual
Freedom, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1952).
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In 1951 came a further undermining of the protection tradi-
tionally accorded an accused when the original Executive Order
was amended to change the standard for disqualification from
"reasonable grounds . . .for belief that the person involved is
disloyal" to one of "reasonable doubt" as to his "loyalty. '47 The
John Steiiart Service case 48 illustrates the grave effect of this
amendment which for all practical purposes scuttles the pre-
sumption of innocence and places upon the accused the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt his loyalty and integrity.
The new Executive Order49 extending the so-called "secur-
ity risk" program to all departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment seems to give even less protection to an accused. 50
(2) Treatment of Aliens
Another great departure from historical standards of justice
is our increasingly intolerant treatment of aliens. Two recent
decisions of the Supreme Court are illustrative. 51 In the Knauff
case 5 2 the German-born bride of an American war veteran was
excluded without a hearing under authority of wartime security
regulations on the ground that disclosure of the basis for her ex-
clusion would be prejudicial to the public interest. Invoking the
right-privilege distinction, Mr. Justice Minton announced the
absence of a constitutional right to a hearing in exclusion cases.
More recently, the Court upheld the exclusion without a hearing
of an alien who had resided twenty-five years in the United
States and sought re-entry after a nineteen month sojourn be-
hind the Iron Curtain allegedly undertaken to visit his dying
mother.5 3 There was no denial of due process, the Court said,
47. Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (1951).
48. Department of State, Press Release No. 1088 (Dec. 13, 1951).
49. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
50. For description and discussion of the security risk program, see
Gellhorn, Security, Loyalty and Science, ch. IV (1950); Barth, The Loyalty
of Free Men, ch. VI (1951).
51. Other cases are Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (denial of
bail to aliens held under a warrant of deportation); and Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation of former Communist upheld).
The statute upheld in the Harisiades case made deportation mandatory for
any alien who was at the time of entering the United States "or has been
at any time thereafter" a member of a proscribed organization. The statute
was applied to Harisiades even though he had terminated his membership in
the Communist Party before its enactment. The Internal Security Act of
1950 amended the Immigration Act to make aliens deportable for member-
ship in certain proscribed organizations or any other "totalitarian party" at
any time during their lives, whether before or after entry into the United
States, 8 U.S.C. § 137(2) (Supp. 1952); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (1953).
52. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
53. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Cf.
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
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even though the refusal of other countries to accept the alien
would likely result in his permanent detention at Ellis Island.
(3) The Internal Security Act of 1950
This act 54 may be "regarded as a fitting climax to . . . [a]
decade of fear-inspired legislative and executive action." 55 It
makes it clear that not even the ordinary citizen can feel secure
in what he has hitherto regarded as basic rights of freedom. In
addition to the registration and immigration provisions, the
statute authorizes the President, acting through the Attorney
General, to apprehend and detain in time of an "internal Security
Emergency" any person, citizen or alien, "as to whom there is
reasonable ground to believe . . . probably will engage in, or
probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage
or of sabotage."56 In the hearing after detention the Attorney
General need establish only probable cause.57 On appeal to the
Detention Review Board the issue is "whether there is reason-
able ground to believe"58 and judicial review is limited to
whether the findings are supported by "reliable, substantial, and
probative evidence." 59
Even more drastic than those dealing with the quantum of
proof is the provision that while the detainee may, at the hear-
ing, introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses "the Attor-
ney General or his representative shall not be required to fur-
nish information the revelation of which would disclose the
identity or evidence of Government agents or officers which he
believes it would be dangerous to national safety and security to
divulge." 60 Likewise, upon review by either the Detention Re-
view Board or a Court of Appeals the Attorney General is re-
quired to present the evidence supporting a finding of reasonable
ground for detention only to the extent "consistent with na-
tional security . . . but he shall not be required to offer or pre-
sent evidence of any agents or officers of the Government the
revelation of which in his judgment would be dangerous to the
security and safety of the United States."'
54. 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
55. O'Brlan, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 21 (1952).
56. 50 U.S.C. § 813(a) (Supp. 1952).
57. 50 U.S.C. § 814(d) (Supp. 1952).
58. 50 U.S.C. § 819(a) (2) (Supp. 1952).
59. 50 U.S.C. § 821(c) (Supp. 1952).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 814(d) (Supp. 1952).
61. 50 U.S.C. § 814(f). See also 50 U.S.C. § 819(c) (Supp. 1952).
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(4) The Conscientious Objector Cases
Under the Selective Service Act 62 any person "who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form" may claim exemption from
military service. If his claim is rejected by his local draft board
he is entitled to an appeal to the "appropriate appeal board." The
appeal board refers the claim to the Department of Justice "for
inquiry and hearing." The Department of Justice then makes a
recommendation to the appeal board which the latter may or
may not follow. If the appeal board decides against the registrant
and orders him to report for induction, his only remedy is to
refuse induction and undergo criminal prosecution. As a matter
of practice, the Department of Justice utilizes the FBI to investi-
gate the claims referred to it. The FBI renders a report (a sum-
mary of its "raw files") to a "hearing officer" who makes the
recommendations to the appeal board.
In a number of cases the question arose as to whether the
statute or due process required that the FBI report be made
available to the appeal board and to the registrant and also
whether the registrant was entitled to be informed of the names
of persons interviewed by the investigators. To resolve a conflict
the Supreme Court decided the issue in United States v. Nu-
gent.65 Speaking for a majority of five to three, Chief Justice
Vinson concluded:6 4
"We think the Department of Justice satisfies its duties
under § 6 (j) when it accords a fair opportunity to the regis-
trant to speak his piece before an impartial hearing officer;
when it permits him to produce all relevant evidence in his
own behalf and at the same time supplies him with a fair
r6sum6 of any adverse evidence in the investigator's report."
To support this conclusion the Chief Justice reasoned as
follows:(" The word "hearing" in the statute does not compre-
hend such "formal and litigious procedures" as the "right to
confront every informant who may have rendered adverse com-
ment to the FBI." The duty of the Department of Justice is merely
"to advise, to render an auxiliary service to the appeal board"
and to help it "reach a more informed judgment." It is not "the
62. 50 U.S.C. (App.) § 456(j) (Supp. 1952).
63. 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
64. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
65. Id. at 8 et seq.
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function of this auxiliary procedure to provide a full-scale trial"
and the statute does not require the department "to entertain
an all-out collateral attack at the hearing on the testimony ob-
tained in its prehearing investigation." The Selective Service Act
"is a valid exercise of the war power .. .calculated to function
. . . in times of peril" and procedures under it "must be geared
to meet the imperative needs of mobilization and national vigi-
lance-when there is no time for 'litigious interruptions.'"
First of all it is difficult to see how an "auxiliary service"
can be of much help to an appeal board in reaching a fair and
"informed judgment" if the appeal board does not know what
the "fair resume of any adverse evidence" is a resume of. Nor
does there appear to be any reason why the "fair resume" should
be limited to "adverse evidence. '6 6 An informed judgment would
seem to require the consideration of favorable evidence as well,
if the FBI investigation disclosed it. And, even if the resume is
fair it still does not disclose the identity of informants thus
depriving the registrant of the opportunity to interrogate or
impeach them.
It is true that if FBI reports (including the identity of in-
formants) are disclosed valuable sources may dry up. "But," as
Mr. Justice Douglas put it in his dissenting opinion, "that is not
the choice. If the aim is to protect the underground of informers,
the FBI report need not be used. If it is used, then fairness re-
quires that the names of the accusers be disclosed. Without the
identity of the informer the person investigated or accused
stands helpless. The prejudices, the credibility, the passions, the
perjury of the informer are never known. If they were exposed,
the whole charge might wither under the cross-examination. '67
66. See Judge Jerome Frank's opinion in the court below. United States
v. Nugent, 200 F. 2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1952):
"Even if the F.B.I. report were favorable to the defendant, it may
well be that the statute required that it be disclosed to him at or before
the hearing held by the hearing officer. Cf. Griffin v. United States, 87
U.S. App. D.C. 172, 183 F. 2d 990, 993, where the court said that 'the case
emphasizes the necessity of disclosure by the prosecution of evidence
that may reasonably be considered admissible and useful to the defense.'
True, the hearing here was not a criminal trial. But its effects on de-
fendant might be fully as important."
67. Mr. Justice Douglas in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 14 (1953)
(dissenting opinion).
It should be noted that the Nugent case leaves undecided the question
of disclosure at the criminal trial. See notes 30-34 supra, and Judge Frank's
opinion in the court below.
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The "times of peril" argument of the Chief Justice was met
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as follows: 
68
"The enemy is not yet so near the gate that we should
allow respect for traditions of fairness, which has heretofore
prevailed in this country, to be overborne by military exi-
gencies."
CONCLUSION
It has not been the purpose of these strictures to disparage
all governmental action diricted to protecting national security.
Rather they are aimed at the phases of this action which will
lead, if unchecked, to the subversion of the American sense of
justice. The greatest danger to our institutions lies in our acqui-
escence in limitations upon those liberties of the individual
which were thought to have been permanently guaranteed by
the Constitution. We need a resurgence of the principles of jus-
tice, such as the right to a fair hearing, upon which our greatness
was built. We should not permit our thinking to be beclouded
by traditional and technical distinctions between criminal, civil,
judicial and administrative proceedings. Nor should we forget
two of the most important lessons of judicial experience: (1) The
difficulty in arriving at satisfactory decisions without patiently
going through a process of due notice and fair hearing wherein
the positions of the parties and all the considerations they can
advance are thoroughly thrashed out; and (2) the hazard of
self-deception involved in settling on any decision which one is
not prepared publicly to support with factual findings from an
acceptable record and a statement of governing principles.
68. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 13 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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